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Crimes of solidarity
Migration and containment through rescue
Martina Tazzioli
‘Solidarity is not a crime.’ This is a slogan that has
circulated widely across Europe in response to legal
prosecutions and municipal decrees, which, espe-
cially in Italy and France, have been intended to act
against citizens who provide logistical and human-
itarian support to transiting migrants. Such crimin-
alisation of individual acts of solidarity and coordin-
ated platforms of refugee support is undertaken both
in the name of national and European laws, in op-
position to the facilitation of irregular entries, and
through arbitrary police measures. In Calais on the
French coast, for example, locals have been prohib-
ited from allowing migrants to take showers in their
homes or to recharge their mobile phones, while in
the Roya Valley at the Italian-French border, many
locals have been placed on trial, including the now
famous ploughman Cedric Herrou. Responding to
accusations that he has been one of the main facilit-
ators along the French-Italian underground migrant
route, Herrou has replied that ‘it is the State that
is acting illegally, not me’, referring to the French
State’s own human rights violations.1
‘Crimes of solidarity’, to use the expression em-
ployed by activists and human rights organisations,
are defined and prosecuted according to the 2002 EU
Directive which prevents and penalises ‘the facilita-
tion of unauthorised entry, transit and residence’ of
migrants. In both Italy and France there are national
laws that criminalise the facilitation and the support
of ‘irregular’ migration; what in France activists call
‘délit de solidarité’. Notably, citizens who help mi-
grants to cross national borders are prosecuted in
Italy under the same law that punishes smugglers
who take money from migrants. In France, the ‘hu-
manitarian clause’, which exempts from sanctions
citizens who support migrants whose life, dignity
and physical integrity is at risk, is often disregarded.
Nonetheless, the expression ‘crimes of solidarity’
should not lead us to overstate the legal dimension
of what is at stake in this. Indeed, the ‘crime’ that is
posited here goeswell beyond the legal boundaries of
European law, as well as national ones, and acquires
an ethical and political dimension. In particular, the
criminalisation of individuals and groupswho are fa-
cilitating the crossing of migrants, without making a
profit fromdoing so, opens up the critical question of
exactly ‘who is a smuggler?’ today. Significantly, the
very definition of ‘smuggling’ in European and inter-
national documents is a fairly slippery one, as the
boundaries between supporting migrants for one’s
own financial benefit or for ‘humanitarian’ reasons
are consistently blurred.2
In a 1979 interview, Michel Foucault stressed
the potential strategic role that might be played by
‘rights’ to ‘mark out for a government its limit’.3 In
this way, Foucault gestured towards an extralegal
conceptualisation and use of rights as actual limits to
be set against governments. In the case of crimes of
solidarity, we are confronted less, however, with the
mobilisation of rights as limits to states’ action than
with what Foucault calls ‘infra-legal illegalisms’;4
namely, with practices of an active refusal of states’
arbitrary measures that are taken in the name of mi-
gration containment, regardless of whether or not
the latter are legally grounded or in violation of the
law.
NGOs and independent organisations that un-
dertake search and rescue activities to save migrants
in the Mediterranean have also been under attack,
accused of collaborating with smuggling networks,
of constituting a pull-factor for migrants, and of fer-
rying them to Europe. Three years after the end of
themilitary-humanitarian operationMare Nostrum,
which was deployed by the Italian Navy to save mi-
grant lives at sea, the Mediterranean has become the
site of a sort of naval battle in which the obliga-
tion to rescue migrants in distress is no longer the
priority. The fight against smugglers and traffickers
has taken central stage, and the figure of the ship-
wrecked refugee has consequently vanished little by
little. Today, thewar on smugglers is presented as the
primary goal and, at the same time, as a strategy to
protect migrants from ‘traffickers’. The criminalisa-
tion of NGOs, like Doctors without Borders, Save the
Children and SOS Mediterranee, and of independent
actors, including Sea-Eye, Sea-Watch, Jugend-Rettet
and Arms Pro-Activa, who conduct search and res-
cue operations, startedwith the simultaneous imple-
mentation of the Libyan mobile sea-barrier, which
charges the Libyan Coast Guard with responsibility
for intercepting migrant vessels and bringing them
back to Libya. As a consequence of this agreement,
being rescued means being captured and contained.
Following the signing of a new bilateral agree-
ment between Libya and Italy in March 2017, in July,
the Italian government put pressure on one of the
three Libyan governments (the one led by Fayez al-
Serraj) demanding better cooperation in intercept-
ing and returning migrants who head to Europe by
sea. In order to accelerate this process, Italy sent two
Navy ships into Libyan national waters,with the pur-
pose of ‘strengthening Libyan sovereignty by helping
the country to keep control of its national waters’.5
Far from being a smooth negotiation, however,
the Libyan government led by General Khalifa Haf-
tar threatened to shoot in the direction of the Italian
ships if they were to violate Libya’s sovereignty by
entering their national territory.6
Overall, the ‘migration deal’ has been made by
the EU and Italy in the context of different asym-
metric relationships: on the one hand, with a ‘rogue
state’ such as Libya, characterised by a fragmented
sovereignty, and on the other, with non-state act-
ors, andmore precisely with the same smugglers that
Europe has supposedly declared war on. Indeed, as
various journalistic investigations have proved, Italy
has paid Libyan militias and smuggling networks to
block migrants’ departures temporarily in exchange
for fewer controls on other smuggling channels, spe-
cifically those involving drugs and weapons. In this
way, smugglers have been incorporated into a polit-
ics of migration containment. Governing migration
through and with smugglers has become fully part
of the EU’s political agenda. As such, a critical ap-
praisal of the criminalisation of migrant smuggling
requires undoing the existing narrative of a war on
smugglers, as well as challenging those analyses that
simply posit smugglers as the straightforward en-
emies of society.
The naval battle in the Mediterranean has not
been an exclusive affair of Italy and Libya. On the
contrary, it is within this type of geopolitical con-
text that the escalating criminalisation of sea rescue
is more broadly taking place.7 On July 31, at the re-
quest of the EuropeanCommission, the ItalianHome
Office released a ‘Code of Conduct’ that NGOs have
been asked to sign if they want to continue search
and rescue activities. Given that the code of conduct
imposes on NGOs the obligation to have armed ju-
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dicial police on board,8 some organisations, includ-
ing Doctors without Borders, Sea Watch and Jugend
Rettet, have refused to sign, arguing that through
the enforcement of the Code of Conduct, and under
pressure from the European Commission, Italy has
turned towards a militarisation of humanitarianism
and of independent actors. As a consequence of the
refusal to sign, their ships have been prevented from
docking in Italian ports and the rescuers of the Ju-
gend Rettet are currently on trial, accused of collab-
orating with Libyan smugglers. On August 11, Libya
traced new virtual restrictive sea borders for NGOs,
declaring that search and rescue ships will not be al-
lowed to get closer than one hundred miles from the
Libyan coast. The humanitarian scene of rescue has
been shrunk.
In such a political context, two interrelated as-
pects emerging from the multiplication of attacks
against refugee support activities and against search
and rescue operations are worth considering. The
first concerns a need to unpack what is now meant
by the very expression ‘crime of solidarity’within the
framework of this shift towards the priority of fight-
ing smugglers over savingmigrants. This requires an
engagement with the biopolitical predicaments that
sustain a debate centered on the question of to what
extent, and up to which point, rescuing migrants at
sea is deemed legitimate. The second, related point
concerns the modes of containment through rescue
that are currently at work in theMediterranean. One
consequence of this is that the reframing of the de-
bate around migrant deaths at sea has lowered the
level of critique of a contemporary politics of mi-
gration more generally: the fight against smugglers
has become the unquestioned and unyielding point
of agreement, supported across more or less the en-
tire European political arena.
The criminalisation of NGOs, accused of ferrying
migrants to Europe, should be read in partial con-
tinuitywith the attack against other forms of support
given to migrants in many European countries. The
use of the term ‘solidarity’ is helpful in this context
insofar as it helps to highlight both actions under-
taken by citizens in support of refugees and, more
importantly, the transversal alliances between mi-
grants and non-migrants. In fact, acting in solid-
arity entails supporting migrant struggles – for ex-
ample, as struggles formovement or struggles to stay
in a certain place – more than it does acting in or-
der to save or bring help to them.9 As Chandra Mo-
hanty argues, practices of solidarity are predicated
upon the recognition of ‘common differences’,10 and
in this sense they entail a certain shared political
space and the awareness of being governed by the
same mechanisms of precaritisation and exploita-
tion.11 In other words, solidarity does not at all im-
ply a simple politics of identity, but requires build-
ing transversal alliances and networks in support of
certain struggles. The reduction of migrants to bod-
ies to be fished out of the water, simultaneous with
the vanishing of the figure of the refugee, preempt-
ively denies the possibility of establishing a common
ground in struggling for freedom of movement and
equal access to mobility.
Despite the many continuities and similarit-
ies between the criminalisation of refugee support
activities on the mainland and at sea, if we shift
the attention to the Mediterranean Sea, what is spe-
cifically at stake here is a biopolitics of rescuing
or ‘letting drown’. Under attack in the Mediter-
ranean scene of rescue and drowning are what could
be termed crimes of humanitarianism; or, that is,
crimes of rescue. Humanitarianismas such,precisely
in its acts of taking migrants out of the sea through
independent search and rescue operations that ex-
ercise an active refusal of the geographical restric-
tions imposed by nation states, has become an un-
comfortable and unbearable mode of intervention in
the Mediterranean.
Geographies of ungrievability
The criminalisation of alliances and initiatives in
support of migrants’ transit should not lead us to
imagine a stark opposition between ‘good humanit-
arians’, on the one side, and bad military actors or
national authorities, on the other. On the contrary,
it is important to keep in mind the many entangle-
ments betweenmilitary andhumanitarianmeasures,
as well as the role played by military actors, such as
the Navy, in performing tasks like rescuing migrants
at sea that could fall under the category of what Cut-
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titta terms ‘military-humanitarianism’.12 Moreover,
the Code of Conduct enforced by the Italian govern-
ment actually strengthens the divide between ‘good’
NGOs and ‘treacherous’ humanitarian actors. Thus,
far from building a cohesive front, the obligation to
sign the Code of Conduct produced a split among
those NGOs involved in search and rescue opera-
tions.
In the meantime, the figure of the refugee at
sea has arguably faded away: sea rescue opera-
tions are in fact currently deployed with the two-
fold task of not letting migrants drown and of fight-
ing smugglers, which de facto entails undermining
the only effective channels of sea passage for mi-
grants across the Mediterranean. From a military-
humanitarian approach that, under Mare Nostrum,
considered refugees at sea as shipwrecked lives, the
unconditionality of rescue is now subjected to the
aim of dismantling the migrants’ logistics of cross-
ing. At the same time, the migrant drowning at sea
is ultimately not seen any longer as a refugee, i.e.
as a subject of rights who is seeking protection, but
as a life to be rescued in the technical sense of be-
ing fished out of the sea. In other words, the mi-
grant at sea is the subject who eventually needs to be
rescued, but not thereby placed into safety by grant-
ing them protection and refuge in Europe. What
happens ‘after landing’ is something not considered
within the framework of a biopolitics of rescuing and
of letting drown.13 Indeed, the latter is not only
about saving (or not saving)migrants at sea, but also,
in a more proactive way, about aiming at human tar-
gets. In manhunting, Gregoire Chamayou explains,
‘the combat zone tends to be reduced to the body of
the enemy’.14 Yet who is the human target of mi-
grant hunts in the Mediterranean? It is not only
the migrant in distress at sea, who in fact is rescued
and captured at the same time; rather, migrants and
smugglers are both considered the ‘prey’ of contem-
porary military-humanitarianism.
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Public debate in Europe about the criminalisa-
tion of NGOs and sea rescue is characterised by
a polarisation between those who posit the non-
negotiable obligation to rescue migrants and those
who want to limit rescue operations in the name of
regaining control over migrant arrivals, stemming
the flows and keeping them in Libya. What remains
outside the order of this discourse is the shrinking
and disappearing figure of the refugee, who is super-
seded by the figure of the migrant to be taken out of
the sea.
Relatedly, the exclusive focus on the Mediter-
ranean Sea itself contributes to strengthening geo-
graphies of ungrievability. By this I mean those pro-
duced hierarchies of migrant deaths that are essen-
tially dependent on their more or less consistent
geographic distance from Europe’s spotlight and, at
the same time, on the assumption of shipwrecked
migrants as the most embodied refugee subjectivit-
ies. More precisely, the recent multiplication of bi-
lateral agreements between EU member states and
African countries has moved back deadly frontiers
from the Mediterranean Sea to the Libyan and Niger
desert. As a consequence, migrants who do not die
at sea but who manage to arrive in Libya are kept in
Libyan prisons.
Containment through rescue
On 12 August 2017, Doctors without Borders de-
cided to stop search and rescue operations in the
Mediterranean after Libya enforced its sea-barrier by
forbidding NGOs to go closer than about one hun-
dred miles from the Libyan coast, and threatening
to shoot at those ships that sought to violate the
ban. In the space of two days, even Save the Chil-
dren and the independent German organisation Sea-
Eye declared that they would also suspend search
and rescue activities. The NGOs’Mediterranean exit
has been presented by humanitarian actors as a re-
fusal to be coopted into the EU-Libyan enforcement
of a sea barrier against migrants. Yet, in truth, both
the Italian government and the EU have been rather
obviously pleased by the humanitarians’ withdrawal
from the Mediterranean scene of drown and rescue.
Should we therefore understand the ongoing
criminalisation of NGOs as the attempt to fully block
migrant flows? Does it indicate a return from the
staging of a ‘good scene of rescue’ back to an overt
militarisation of the Mediterranean? The problem is
that such an analytical angle risks, first, corroborat-
ing the misleading opposition between military in-
tervention and humanitarianism in the field of mi-
gration governmentality. Second, it re-instantiates
the image of a Fortress Europe, while disregarding
the huge ‘migration industry’ that is flourishing both
in Libya, with the smuggling-and-detention market,
and on the Northern shore of the Mediterranean.15
With the empty space left by the NGOs at sea, the
biopolitics of rescuing or letting drown has been re-
shaped by new modes of containment through res-
cue: migrants who manage to leave the Libyan coast
are ‘rescued’ – that is, intercepted and blocked – by
the Libyan Coast Guard and taken back to Libya. Yet
containment should not be confused with detention
nor with a total blockage of migrants’ movements
and departures. Rather, by ‘containment’ I refer to
the substantial disruptions and decelerations of mi-
grant movements, as well as to the effects of more or
less temporary spatial confinement. Modes of con-
tainment through rescue were already in place, to
some extent, when migrants used to be ‘ferried’ to
Italy in a smoother way, by the Navy or by NGOs. In-
deed, from the moment of rescue onward, migrants
were transferred and channelled into the Hotspot
System, where many were denied international pro-
tection and, thus, rendered ‘illegal’ and constructed
as deportable subjects.16 The distinction between
intercepting vessels sailing to Europe and savingmi-
grants in distress has become blurred: with the en-
forcement of the Libyan sea barrier, rescue and cap-
ture can hardly be separated any longer. In this
sense, visibility can be a trap: if images taken by
drones or radars are sent to Italian authorities be-
fore migrants enter international waters, the Italian
CoastGuard has to informLibyan authoritieswho are
in charge of rescuing migrants and thus taking them
back to Libya.
This entails a spatial rerouting of military-
humanitarianism, in which migrants are paradoxic-
ally rescued to Libya. Rather than vanishing from
the Mediterranean scene, the politics of rescue, con-
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ceived in terms of not letting people die, has been re-
shaped as a technique of capture. At the same time,
the geographic orientation of humanitarianism has
been inverted: migrants are ‘saved’ and dropped in
Libya. Despite the fact that various journalistic in-
vestigations and UN reports have shown that after
being intercepted, rescued and taken back to Libya,
migrants are kept in detention in abysmal condi-
tions and are blackmailed by smugglers,17 the public
discussion remains substantially polarised around
the questions of deaths at sea. Should migrants be
saved unconditionally? Or, should rescue be sec-
ondary to measures against smugglers and balanced
against the risk of ‘migrant invasion’? A hierarchy
of the spaces of death and confinement is in part de-
termined by the criterion of geographical proximity,
which contributes to the sidelining ofmechanisms of
exploitation and of a politics of letting die that takes
place beyond the geopolitical borders of Europe. The
biopolitical hold over migrants becomes apparent at
sea: practices of solidarity are transformed into a re-
lationship between rescuers and drowned.18
The criminalisation of refugee support activit-
ies cannot be separated from the increasing crim-
inalisation of refugees as such: not only those who
are labelled and declared illegal as ‘economic mi-
grants’, but also those people who are accorded the
status of refugees. Both are targets of restrictive and
racialised measures of control. The migrant at sea
is presented as part of a continuum of ‘tricky sub-
jectivities’19 – which include the smuggler, the po-
tential terrorist and the refugee–and as both a ‘risky
subject’ and a ‘subject at risk’ at the same time.20
In this regard, it is noticeable that the criminalisa-
tion of refugees as such has been achieved precisely
through the major role played by the figure of the
smuggler. In the EU’s declared fight against smug-
gling networks, migrants at sea are seen not only as
shipwrecked lives to be rescued but also as potential
fake refugees, as concealed terrorists or as traffick-
ers. At the same time, the fight against smugglers
has been used to enact a further shift in the crimin-
alisation of refugees, which goes beyond the alleged
dangerousness of migrants. Indeed, in the name of
the war against the ‘illegal’ smuggling economy, as a
shared priority of both left- and right-wing political
parties in Europe, the strategy of letting migrants
drown comes, in the end, to be justified. As Doc-
tors without Borders have pointed out, ‘by declaring
Libya a safe country, European governments are ulti-
mately pushing forward the humanitarianisation of
what appears at the threshold of the inhuman.’21
The migrant at sea, who is the subject of hu-
manitarianism par excellence, is no longer an indi-
vidual to be saved at all costs, but rather the object
of thorny calculations about the tolerated number
ofmigrant arrivals and themigrant-money exchange
with Libya. Who is (in) danger(ous)? The legal pro-
secutions and the political condemnation of ‘crimes
of rescue’ and of ‘crimes of solidarity’ bring to the
fore the undesirability of refugees as refugees. This
does not depend so much on a logic of social dan-
gerousness as such, but, rather, on the practices of
spatial disobedience that they enact, against the re-
strictions imposed by the European Union. Thus, it
is precisely the irreducibility of migrants to lives to
be rescued that makes the refugee the main figure of
a continuum of tricky subjectivities in a time of eco-
nomic crisis. Yet, a critical engagement with the bi-
opolitics of rescuing and drowning cannot stick to a
North-South gaze on Mediterranean migrations. In
order not to fall into a Eurocentric (or EU-centric)
perspective on asylum, analyses of crimes of solid-
arity should also be articulated through an inquiry
into the Libyan economy ofmigration and themodes
of commodification of migrant bodies, considering
what Brett Neilson calls ‘migration as a currency’;22
that is, as an entity of exchange and as a source of
value extraction.
Crimes of solidarity put in place critical infra-
structures to support migrants’ acts of spatial dis-
obedience. These infra-legal crimes shed light on the
inadequacy of human rights claims and of the legal
framework in a time of hyper-visible and escalating
border violence. Crimes of solidarity consist of in-
dividual and collective active refusals of states’ in-
terventions, which are specifically carried out at the
very edges of the law. In this way, crimes of solid-
arity manage to undo the biopolitics of rescuing and
letting drown by acting beyond the existing scripts
of ‘crisis’ and ‘security’. Rather than being ‘rescued’
from the sea or ‘saved’ from smugglers, migrants are
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supported in their unbearable practices of freedom,
unsettling the contemporary hierarchies of lives and
populations.
Martina Tazzioli is a member of the Radical Philo-
sophy editorial collective, and author of Spaces of Gov-
ernmentality: Autonomous Migration and the Arab
Uprisings (2014).
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